For decades, the candidate nomination process in Nigeria’s political landscape remained vague, convoluted, and fundamentally devoid of due process. Candidates contesting on the platform of one political party routinely kept a foot in the door of another, ready to hop across the fence the moment they lost their original primary election. This pervasive opportunism severely weakened internal party democracy, eroded institutional loyalty, and bred a fractured political culture where money and raw power, rather than statutory rules, dictated who secured a party ticket.
However, the Supreme Court has now delivered a decisive blow to this political opportunism, bringing the long-standing culture of post-primary party-hopping to an abrupt halt. In a unanimous decision delivered by a seven-member panel led by Justice Adamu Jauro, the apex court upheld an appeal filed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), setting aside a Court of Appeal judgement and fully restoring the ruling of the Federal High Court in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/509/2026. By validating Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7), and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, the apex court confirmed that these statutory provisions exist in complete harmony with the 1999 Constitution (as amended). For political parties and ambitious aspirants across the country, the ruling transforms membership registers from flexible administrative rosters into unyielding statutory prerequisites.
Under Section 77(4) of the Electoral Act 2026, every political party must submit its hard and soft copy digital membership register to INEC at least 21 days prior to its primaries, congresses, or conventions. Section 77(5) dictates that only individuals whose names appear on that pre-submitted list are eligible to vote or be voted for. Furthermore, Section 77(6) explicitly prohibits parties from utilizing any supplementary or updated register.
For decades, Nigerian election cycles witnessed a familiar ritual wherein an influential politician loses a party primary in mid-May, decamps to a rival platform by late May, and secures a consensus ticket by early June. The Supreme Court’s judgment firmly closes this door. Because a late defector was still actively contesting primaries under their original party when the receiving party submitted its membership register to INEC, their name cannot legally exist on the receiving party’s pre-submitted database. Under Section 77(6), the receiving party cannot modify or update its register to accommodate the new arrival, rendering any consensus or nomination process built upon such an unsubmitted list statutorily void.
In striking down these sections earlier in the year, the Court of Appeal had reasoned that Section 77 created extra-constitutional eligibility criteria beyond the personal qualifications listed in Sections 65, 106, 131, and 177 of the 1999 Constitution. The Supreme Court dismantled this reasoning, holding that while constitutional qualifications govern personal eligibility, Section 228(a) of the Constitution empowers Parliament to enact laws regulating political party execution, internal administration, and candidate sponsorship. Section 77 does not add to personal qualifications; rather, it regulates party sponsorship; a privilege granted strictly by statute under Section 221.
Crucially, because the Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeal’s ruling, the doctrine of reversal ex tunc(from the beginning) applies. The Court of Appeal’s decision is deemed erroneous ab initio, meaning that political parties and candidates who engaged in post-primary cross-carpeting while relying on the appellate ruling acted pendente lite and assumed the absolute legal risk of reversal.
The operational consequences for aggrieved candidates jumping ship and the political platforms accommodating them are severe. Any candidate who lost a primary in Party A, defected to Party B, and secured a consensus ticket without appearing on Party B’s pre-submitted Section 77 register faces total judicial disqualification. Beyond disqualification, Section 115 of the Electoral Act 2026 explicitly criminalises dual party membership and signing nomination papers for multiple platforms during the same election cycle, exposing defectors to heavy fines and imprisonment.
Furthermore, under established legal precedents affirmed in Amaechi v. INEC and APC v. Marafa, votes cast in a general election for a candidate who was invalidly nominated are legally classified as “wasted votes”, with victory automatically awarded to the runner-up who met all statutory conditions. Coupled with Section 33, which strictly limits candidate substitution to death or voluntary written withdrawal, a political party whose defector ticket is voided by a court after primary windows have closed cannot hold fresh primaries or swap candidates, leaving its ballot slot completely vacant.
Despite these substantive illegalities, judicial enforcement remains strictly bounded by procedural mechanics. Under Section 285(14) of the Constitution and Section 88(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, only a cleared aspirant who participated in the receiving party’s primary process possesses the locus standi to challenge an illegal consensus nomination, and this challenge must be filed at the Federal High Court within 14 days. Rival political parties cannot challenge a defector’s nomination pre-election due to lack of standing, and as affirmed in Ahiwe v. Otti, Election Petition Tribunals lack jurisdiction post-election to entertain petitions grounded on pre-election Section 77 register compliance.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s ruling in INEC v. Zenith Labour Party establishes an era of mandatory statutory discipline in Nigerian democracy. While political parties retain the right to nominate candidates, that privilege must be exercised strictly within Parliament’s statutory framework. For political platforms and ambitious defectors alike, ignoring the 21-day digital register mandate transforms electoral tickets into legal nullities.
– Onogwu Muhammed, Esq. writes from Abuja.
